Assuming you are fortunate enough to obtain a pardon, does that automatically mean that you can get your criminal record sealed or expunged?

          That was the question decided by the Florida Supreme Court in the case of R.J.L. v. State of Florida.

          In that case, an individual with the initials “R.J.L.” was convicted of kidnapping but was later granted a full pardon.  40 years after receiving that pardon, R.J.L. applied to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) for a certificate of eligibility to have his criminal record expunged.  FDLE denied the application because according to Florida law, a person cannot get his record expunged if he was adjudicated guilty of the crime that he is applying to have expunged from his record.  When R.J.L. pointed out that he had been granted a full pardon, FDLE responded that the pardon did not remove the fact that he was adjudicated guilty of kidnapping and therefore legally ineligible to have his record expunged.  R.J.L. ultimately appealed to Florida’s Supreme Court.

          The issue decided by the Supreme Court was whether R.J.L.’s pardon acted to eliminate his adjudication of guilt so as to make him legally eligible to have his record expunged.        

          Unfortunately for R.J.L. and for those in a similar situation, Florida’s Supreme Court sided with FDLE and against R.J.L.  In doing so, the Court stated:

          That was the ruling in the case of Harman v. State of Florida. 

          In that case, Mr. Harman, who had previously been charged with second-degree murder, filed a petition asking a judge to expunge his criminal history record.  The judge, however, refused Harman’s request even though the State Attorney’s Office had originally dropped the case.  The judge’s reasons for doing so were:

          1.  The crime of second-degree murder is serious; and

          2.  Mr. Harman had been previously accused of domestic violence.

          Harman appealed that decision to Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal which reversed the lower court’s order because:

          1.  The seriousness of a charge, standing alone, is insufficient to support the denial of a request to expunge  a criminal record; and

          2.  The prosecutor failed to present any evidence supporting his allegation that Harman had previously committed an act of domestic violence.

          As a result, the appellate court sent Harman’s case back to the trial judge and ordered him to reconsider Harman’s request that his record be expunged.

That is precisely what happened in the case of Orozco v. State of Florida.  In that case, Ms. Orozco pled guilty to the crime of petit theft, and adjudication was withheld.  Sometime later, she filed a petition to seal her criminal record along with all the necessary paperwork including a certificate from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement stating that she was legally eligible to have her record sealed.  Instead of scheduling a hearing to decide Orozco’s petition, however, the judge hearing her case simply entered an order denying her petition.

On appeal, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the lower-court decision stating that since Orozco complied with all the necessary requirements, the judge deciding her case should have ordered that her record be sealed unless there was a good reason to deny it.  The court of appeal, therefore, sent Orozco’s case back to the lower court to have a hearing to decide whether or not such a reason existed.

For example, in the case of Kanji v. State of Florida, Mr. Kanji filed a petition to expunge his criminal history record.  The prosecuting attorney objected to his petition for the following reasons:

1.  “[M]embers of the public who came into contact with Kanji should have unfettered access to his criminal history records so they might be better informed before establishing a relationship with him;” and

2.   “The arresting affidavits reflected that Kanji’s purported wrongdoing constituted a ‘violation of trust’ because the alleged victim was a family friend.”

The trial judge hearing Kanji’s petition ultimately denied it but in so doing failed to state why.  Kanji appealed the judge’s ruling, and the appellate court hearing the case decided in Kanji’s favor stating that “[i]n exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider all the facts and circumstances and may not deny the petition based solely on the nature of the crime.”  The appellate court then sent the case back to the trial judge and instructed her to either grant Kanji’s petition or else state why she was again denying it.